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applicable where extremely dangerous specialized work is being per-
formed on a dead ship.
The dissenters complained the Sieracki doctrine had been inverted
by the majority so that a shipowner can escape his duties relative to sea-
worthiness by contracting the dangerous work to non-seamen. Modern
ships are outfitted with modem equipment, and contracting out the
dangerous maintenance work on such equipment has become the estab-
lished practice. Further, the Halecki doctrine would introduce con-
fusion. Who can tell what is traditional?
Whatever might have been the purpose behind the majority opinion,.
and the most cogent seems to be the substitution of the old "historical"
test for a new "traditional" test, the dissent seems to have the better
of the argument-at least to the extent that a rather definite standard
has been traded for a somewhat nebulous one. Halecki has created
a new area of confusion in a once certain field of the law already fraught
with indecisiveness in other areas.
Guy C. EVANS
Contracts-Liability of Minor Upon Disaffirmance
The policy of North Carolina has been to cloak an infant with a
mantle of protection in his contract dealings with adults by allowing
him to disaffirm his contracts for personalty1 either before2 or within
a reasonable time after3 attaining his majority. The dominant purpose
justifying this principle is to protect the minor from his own improvi-
dence or want of discretion, and from the wiles of designing adults.
4
The disaffirmance when made is irrevocable,3 voids the contract ab
initio,6 and entitles the infant to a return of any consideration passing
from him, either in specie or its equivalent ;7 but the infant, unless he has
the consideration within his possession or control, is not required to
place the other party in status quo ante.8
clearly a twilight zone in which the employees must have their rights determined
case by case, and in which particular facts and circumstances are vital elements."
Id. at 256.
'An infant's deed of realty can be neither disaflirmed nor ratified before he
attains his majority. McCormic v. Leggett, 53 N.C. 425 (1862).
'Hight v. Harris, 188 N.C. 328, 124 S.E. 623 (1924).
'Coker v. Virginia-Carolina Joint-Stock Land Bank, Inc., 208 N.C. 41, 178 S.E.
863 (1935). The infant is liable for personal necessities if the contract price is
reasonable. Barger v. M. & J. Fin. Corp., 221 N.C. 64, 18 S.E.2d 826 (1942);
Hyman v. Cain, 48 N.C. 111 (1855); Smith v. Young, 19 N.C. 26 (1836). Cer-
tain contracts are permitted by statute. See N.C. GEir. STAT. § 39-4 (1950).
'McCormick v. Crotts, 198 N.C. 664, 153 S.E. 152 (1930).
Pippen v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 130 N.C. 23, 40 S.E. 822 (1902).
Coker v. Virginia-Carolina Joint-Stock Land Bank, Inc., 208 N.C. 41, 178
S.E. 863 (1935).
" Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs, Inc., 197 N.C. 659, 150 S.E. 177 (1929).
' Faircloth v. Johnson, 189 N.C. 429, 127 S.E. 346 (1925). Accord, Bell v.
[Vol. 37
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The recent case of Fisher v. Taylor Motor Co.9 reiterated the rule
that the infant is not required to return the consideration received unless
he has it in hand. Plaintiff, a 20 year old sailor, purchased from de-
fendant an automobile for $750, four-fifths of which was his own money
and one-fifth of which was furnished by his father. Four months later
the vehicle was destroyed in an accident which resulted in plaintiff's
being convicted of careless and reckless driving. Subsequently, plaintiff
disaffirmed the contract and sued to recover the purchase price. De-
fendant counterclaimed for damages to the car caused by the unlawful
acts of the plaintiff. The court allowed the minor to recover that
portion of the purchase price actitally furnished by him'0 less the value
of the automobile in its wrecked condition. Holding that defendant
recovers nothing on his counterclaim, the court stated that "'the infant
is not required to account for the use or depreciation of the property
while in his possession, or for its loss, if squandered or destroyed .... ,,
This case is illustrative of the majority view that a disaffirming
infant who sues to recover what he has given under the contract is not
required to compensate the adult for the use or depreciation of the
property while in the minor's possession. 12 The reasoning is that since
the infant could avoid a contract to pay for the use or depreciation, the
adult should not be able to collect for it by way of recoupment. Other
courts 13 grant the adult a set-off, on the principle that the infant should
Burkhalter, 176 Ala. 62, 57 So. 460 (1912) ; Barr v. Packard Motor Car Co., 172
Mich. 299, 137 N.W. 697 (1912); Craig v. Van Bebber, 100 Mo. 584, 13 S.W.
906 (1890) ; Blake v. Harding, 54 Utah 158, 180 Pac. 172 (1919).
0 249 N.C. 617, 107 S.E.2d 94 (1959).
'o Accord, McCarty-Greene Motor Co. v. McCluney, 219 Ala. 211, 121 So. 713
(1929). Contra, Carpenter v. Grow, 247 Mass. 133, 141 N.E. 859 (1923).
11249 N.C. at 620, 107 S.E.2d at 97, qudting from Collins v. Norfleet-Baggs,
Inc., 197 N.C. 659, 660, 150 S.E. 177, 178 (1929). This is true even though three-
fifths of the infant's payments were earned from the use of the property purchased.
Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N.C. 109, 116 S.E. 261 (1923). On
the other hand the adult is required to compensate the infant for the use and de-
preciation of the chattel given in part payment by the minor. Greensboro Morris
Plan Co. v. Palmer, mtpra; Murdock v. Fisher Fin. Corp., 79 Cal. App. 787, 251
Pac. 319 (Dist. Ct. App. 1926).
%2 See, e.g., Arkansas Reo Motor Car Co. v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S.W.
975 (1924); Story & Clark Piano Co. v. Davy, 68 Ind. App. 150, 119 N.E. 177(1918) ; Utterstrom v. Myron D. Kidder, Inc., 124 Me. 10, 124 Atl. 725 (1924) ;
Gillis v. Goodwin, 180 Mass. 140, 61 N.E. 813 (1901) ; Reynolds v. Garber-Buick
Co., 183 Mich. 157, 149 N.W. 985 (1914) ; Freiburghaus v. Herman Body Co., 102
S.W.2d 743 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937) ; Standard Motor Co. v. Stillians, 1 S.W.2d 332
(Tex. Civ. App. 1928) ; Blake v. Harding, 54 Utah 158, 180 Pac. 172 (1919) ;
Hines v. Cheshire, 36 Wash. 2d 467, 219 P.2d 100 (1950) ; Snodderly v. Brother-
ton, 173 Wash. 86, 21 P.2d 1036 (1933).
" See, e.g., Rice Auto Co. v. Spillman, 280 Fed. 452 (D.C. Cir. 1922) ; Murdock
v. Fisher Fin. Corp., 79 Cal. App. 787, 251 Pac. 319 (Dist. Ct. App. 1926) ; Rice v.
Butler, 160 N.Y. 578, 55 N.E. 275 (1899); Gaither v. Wallingford, 101 Ore. 389,
200 Pac. 910 (1921) ; Pettit v. Liston, 97 Ore. 464, 191 Pac. 660 (1920).
An affirmative recovery has been allowed against the infant by the adult when
the amount the infant had paid on the contract was less than the value of the
use and depreciation. Toon v. Mack Internatl Motor Truck Corp., 87 Cal. App.
1959]
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not be allowed to retain the benefits of the contract while at the same
time refusing to make an allowance for its equivalent.
Some courts have intimated that upon disaffirmance the minor would
be held to account by way of recoupment for any wanton or wilful dam-
ages to the property, 14 apparently reasoning that the adult in dealing with
the infant only assumes the risk of his improvidence and lack of discre-
tion, and should not be required to suffer loss from the minor's wilful
and wanton acts. Other courts seem not to have recognized such a
distinction. 15 Our court in the instant case appears to side with this
latter view by rejecting the defendant's contention that an infant who is
responsible to society generally for his unlawful acts should be re-
sponsible specifically to one who is directly damaged by them, even
though a contract may be involved.
Where the infant has obtained possession of the chattel under a bail-
ment or conditional sales contract, most courts agree that upon dis-
affirmance he is not liable for damage resulting from ignorance or un-
skillfulness in its use,' 6 this being the very improvidence which allows
the infant to disaffirm. However, when the infant wilfully departs from
the objects of the bailment, or uses the property in an unlawful manner,
by a fiction of the law this is construed as an election to disaffirm the
contract. The minor then becomes liable as a converter for any loss or
damage to the chattel resulting from his wilful17 or unlawful acts.18
There appears to be no North Carolina case holding this way. How-
ever, our court has held that if an infant uses a car held under a condi-
tional sales contract in an illegal manner causing it to be confiscated and
151, 262 Pac. 51 (Dist. Ct. App. 1927). Connecticut has held the infant liable
for use but not for depreciation. Creer v. Active Auto Exch., 99 Conn. 266, 121
Atl. 888 (1923). In Minnesota and New Hampshire an infant is held bound by
his contracts found to be reasonable and provident to the extent of the benefit actu-
ally derived by him, if after demand he fails to restore the value of the benefits
so received. Bergland v. Am. Multigraph Sales Co., 135 Minn. 67, 160 N.W. 191
(1916) ; Hall v. Butterfield, 59 N.H. 354 (1879).
" See, e.g., Whitman v. Allen, 123 Me. 1, 121 Atl. 160 (1923) ; Wooldridge v.
Lavoie, 79 N.H. 21, 104 At. 346 (1918) ; Levine v. Mallon Oldsmobile Co., 127
N.J.L. 197, 21 A.2d 852 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Lowery v. Cate, 108 Tenn. 54, 64 S.W.
106& (1901); Standard Motor Co. v. Stillians, 1 S.W.2d 332 (Tex. Civ. App.
1928) ; Mast v. Strahan, 225 S.W. 790 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
'-'See, e.g., Quality Motors, Inc. v. Hays, 216 Ark. 264, 225 S.W.2d 326
(1949); Arkansas Reo Motor Car Co. v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S.W. 975
(1924); Klaus v. A. C. Thompson Auto & Buggy Co., 131 Minn. 10, 154 N.W. 508
(1915).
Jones v. Milner, 53 Ga. App. 304, 185 S.E. 586 (1936); Daugherty v.
Reveal, 54 Id. App. 71, 102 N.E. 381 (1913); Stack v. Cavanaugh, 67 N.H. 149,
30 Atl. 350 (1892) ; Eaton v. Hill, 50 N.H. 235 (1870) ; Brunhoelzl v. Brandes, 90
N.J.L. 31, 100 Atl. 163 (Sup. Ct. 1917) ; Philleo v. Sanford, 17 Tex. 227 (1856);
Miller v. Peck, 258 S.W. 887 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
1" Vasse v Smith, 10 US. (6 Cranch) 226 (1810); Smith v. Moschetti, 213
Ark. 968, 214 S.W.2d 73 (1948); Churchill v. White, 58 Neb. 22, 78 N.W. 369
(1899) ; Freeman v. Boland. 14 R.I. 39 (1882) ; Ray v. Tubbs, 50 Vt. 688 (1878).
18 Vermont Acceptance Corp. v. Wiltshire, 103 Vt. 219, 153 AtI. 199 (1931).
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sold under a forfeiture sale, the infant inay be liable for negligence in
failing to notify his condtional sales vendor of the proceedings.19
A different situation is presented where the infant has been guilty of
misrepresenting his age to induce the adult to enter into the contract.
Since a minor is generally held liable for his torts not arising out of
contract,20 a majority of the courts allow an action for fraud and deceit
predicated upon the infants misrepresentation, 21 reasoning that but for
the fraud there would have been no contract. Since the fraud is ante-
cedent to the making of the contract, it is considered as a separate and
distinct tort not arising out of the contract. Moreover, the method of
measuring damages in the tort action being different from that used to
calculate damages in contract cases, the action does not indirectly en-
force the contract.2 2  North Carolina has, however, refused to coun-
tenance this view23 and by a divided court reasoned that it would be
tantamount to enforcing the contract by changing the form of action
from contract to tort, and would in effect ignore the policy of the law
which is more concerned with protecting infants from their contractual
obligations than imposing liability on them for their torts.24
When the infant is sued on the contract, some few courts prevent
him from pleading infancy by using his misrepresentation of age as the
" Williams v. Aldridge Motors, Inc., 237 N.C. 352, 75 S.E.2d 237 (1953). How-
ever, the vendor must show that he has not received notice of the confiscation
and forfeiture sale from any other source, and that if he had intervened at the
sale he would have been entitled to have the sales proceeds applied in satisfaction of
his lien under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18-6 (Supp. 1957).
0 Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N.C. 109, 116 S.E. 261 (1923)
(dictum) ; Moore v. Home, 153 N.C. 413, 69 S.E. 409 (1910) (dictum) ; Smith
v. Kron, 96 N.C. 392, 2 S.E. 533 (1887) (dictum). See 27 Am. J R. Infants § 90
(1940) ; PRossm, ToRTs § 109, at 788 (2d ed. 1955).
"See, e.g., Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., 273 U.S. 18 (1927) ; Dick Murphy
Inc. v. Holcer, 57 F.2d 431 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Creer v. Active Auto Exch., 99
Conn. 266, 121 At. 888 (1923); Berryman v. Highway Trailer Co., 307 Ill. App.
480, 30 N.E.2d 761 (1940); Rice v. Boyer, 108 Ind. 472, 9 N.E. 420 (1886);
Steigerwalt v. Woodhead Co., 186 Minn. 558, 244 N.W. 412 (1932); Byers v.
Lemay Bank & Trust Co., 365 Mo. 341, 282 S.W.2d 512 (1955) ; Fitts. v. Hall,
9 N.H. 441 (1838); Mestetzko v. Elf Motor Co., 119 Ohio St. 575, 165 N.E. 93
(1929).
The misrepresentation must be affirmative, not constructive. Wisconsin Loan
& Fin. Corp. v. Goodnough, 201 Wis. 101, 228 N.W. 484 (1930).
The infant is not liable, however, for misrepresentations concerning the subject
matter of the contract. Collins v. Gifford, 203 N.Y. 465, 96 N.E. 721 (1911);
Lesnick v. Pratt, 116 Vt. 477, 78 A.2d 487 (1951).
"2 See Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N.C. 109, 119, 116 S.E. 261,
265 (1923) (dissenting opinion by Stacy, J.).
" Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N.C. 109, 116 S.E. 261 (1923).
Accord, Drennen Motor Car Co. v. Smith, 230 Ala. 275, 160 So. 761 (1935);
Monumental Bldg. Ass'n No. 2 v. Herman, 33 Md. 128 (1870) ; Brooks v. Sawyer,
191 Mass. 151, 76 N.E. 953 (1906) ; Slayton v. Barry, 175 Mass. 513, 56 N.E. 574(1900) ; Spangler & Co. v. Haupt, 53 Pa. Super. 545 (1913) ; Nash v. Jewett, 61
Vt. 501, 18 Atl. 47 (1889) ; Johnson v. Pie, 1 Lev. 169, 83 Eng. Reprint 353 (1665).
" Accord, Tyda v. Reiter-Schmidt, Inc., 16 Ill. App.2d 370, 147 N.E.2d 690
(1958) ; Brown v. Wood, 293 Mich. 148, 291 N.W. 255 (1940).
1959]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
basis for estoppel.2 5 North Carolina,26 in accord with the majority,27 has
consistently refused to estop the infant, saying that this would deprive
him of his traditional defense of infancy and open up the way for reck-
less youths "to evade the law by lying."28  Where, however, the infant
brings suit seeking disaffirmance and recovery of the consideration he
has given under the contract, a majority of the jurisdictions invoke the
estoppel doctrine.29 Several states provide for estoppel by statute.80
The net result is that North Carolina in most instances denies the
adult any relief in his dealings with the educated and sophisticated
youths of today. The infant who misrepresents his age is not estopped
from asserting his minority as a defense,31 nor is he liable for fraud and
deceit.3 2 He is not held accountable for the use and depreciation of the
property while in his possession,. 3 and is not liable for negligent and
"See, e.g., Clemons v. Olshire, 54 Ga. App. 290, 187 S.E. 711 (1936) ; Hood v.
Duren, 33 Ga. App. 203, 125 S.E. 787 (1924) ; Damron v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky.
268, 61 S.W. 459 (1901) ; Klinch v. Reeder, 107 Neb. 342, 185 N.W. 1000 (1921) ;
La Rosa v. Nichols, 92 N.J.L. 375, 105 At. 201 (Ct Err. & App. 1918) ; Harseim
v. Cohen, 25 S.W. 977 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894).
,8 Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N.C. 109, 116 S.E. 261 (1923);
Chandler v. Jones, 172 N.C. 569, 90 S.E. 580 (1916); Carolina Interstate Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Black, 119 N.C. 323, 25 S.E. 975 (1896).
"' See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Buster, 124 Ala. 574, 26 So. 940 (1899); Arkansas
Reo Motor Co. v. Goodlett, 163 Ark. 35, 258 S.W. 975 (1924) ; Creer v. Active
Auto Exch., 99 Conn. 266, 121 At. 888 (1923); Price v. Jennings, 62 Ind. 111(1878) ; Sawyer Boot & Shoe Co. v. Braverman, 126 Me. 70, 136 At. 290 (1927) ;
Raymond v. General Motorcycle Co., 230 Mass. 54, 119 N.E. 359 (1918); Folds
v. Allardt, 35 Minn. 488, 29 N.W. 201 (1886) ; Sternlieb v. Normandie Nat'l Sec.
Corp., 263 N.Y. 245, 188 N.E. 726 (1934).
8 Carolina Interstate Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Black, 119 N.C. 323, 329, 25 S.E.
975, 976 (1896).
28 See, e.g., Mossler Acceptance Co. v. Perlnman, 47 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1950);
Carney v. Southland Loan Co., 92 Ga. App. 559, 88 S.E.2d 806 (1955) ; Watters
v. Arrington, 39 Ga. App. 275, 146 S.E. 773 (1929) ; Lewis v. Van Cleve, 302
Ill. 413, 134 N.E. 804 (1922) ; Pinnacle Motor Co. v. Daugherty, 231 Ky. 626, 21
S.W.2d 1001 (1929) ; Adkins v. Adkins, 183 Ky. 662, 210 S.W. 462 (1919); John-
son v. McAdory, 228 Miss. 453, 88 So. 2d 106 (1956); Brinkmann v. Dorsey
Motors, Inc., 121 N.J.L. 115, 1 A.2d 473 (Sup. Ct. 1938), affrn'd 122 N.J.L. 378, 5
A.2d 686 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939) ; International Land Co v. Marshall, 22 Okla.
693, 98 Pac. 951 (1908); Tuck v. Payne, 159 Tenn. 192, 17 S.W.2d 8 (1929);
Stallard v. Sutherland, 131 Va. 316, 108 S.E. 568 (1921); Lubin v. Cowell, 25
Wash. 2d 171, 170 P.2d 301 (1946); Williamson v. Jones, 43 W.Va. 562, 27 S.E.
411 (1897). There appears to be no North Carolina case on this point.
oIND. ANN. STAT. § 18-2006 (1950) ; IOWA CODE § 599.3 (1954) ; KAN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 38-103 (1949); MIcH. Comr. LAWS § 691.531 (1948); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 15-2-3 (1953) ; WASH. Ry. CODE § 26.28.040 (1958). Virginia places an
affirmative duty upon the minor to disclose his minority in his business transactions.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8-135 (1957). New York denies disaffirmance where the infant
is engaged in business and the contract is reasonable, N.Y. DEBT. AND CRED. LAW§ 260, as do Iowa, Kansas, Utah, and Washington, supra. In Georgia an infant
engaging in business as an adult with the consent of his parent or guardian cannot
disaffirm contracts arising therefrom. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-203 (1936).
" Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, 185 N.C. 109, 116 S.E. 261 (1923);
Chandler v. Jones. 172 N.C. 569, 90 S.E. 580 (1916); Carolina Interstate Bldg.
& Loan Ass'n v. Black. 119 N.C. 323, 25 S.E. 975 (1896).
22 Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v. Palmer, supra note 31.
22 McCormick v. Crotts, 198 N.C. 664, 153 S.E. 152 (1930) ; Collins v. Norfleet-
Baggs, Inc., 197 N.C. 659, 150 S.E. 177 (1929); Greensboro Morris Plan Co. v.
Palmer, supra note 31.
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unlawful8 4 acts causing damage to the property prior to his avoidance of
the contract.3 5 The only relief available for the adult in the normal case
is the right to regain whatever remains in the minor's possession at the
time of disaffirmance.8 6
Surely the policy of the law should be to discourage rather than
countenance fraud, recklessness, and lawlessness in the adults of to-
morrow. Several states have met this problem with statutory pro-
visions8 7 requiring as a condition to disaffirmance that the infant, if over
eighteen at the inception of the contract, restore the consideration or pay
its equivalent to the party from whom it was received. This has the
effect of requiring the more mature infant to pay for the depreciation
and beneficial use and to account for any damages done to the property,
while at the same time preserving his right of avoidance. It is hoped
that our Legislature will consider enacting such a statute, in view of the
tremendous number of purchases of personalty made by minors today.
RICHARD VON BIBERSTEIN, JR.
Credit Transactions-Security Agreement Stipulating That on Sale of
the Security Property the Security Attaches to the Proceeds
In Presley E. Broum Lumber Co. v. Textile Banking Co.,' a furni-
ture manufacturer, who was financially impoverished, needed raw mate-
rials in the form of core stock, the base to which veneer is applied. The
plaintiff-lumber company had such stock to sell but was unwilling to
sell to the furniture manufacturer on credit. An agreement was reached
whereby the lumber company would consign the core stock to the furni-
ture manufacturer. Title to the raw materials was to remain in the
plaintiff until the finished product was sold, at which time the title to
the raw materials was to transfer over to the proceeds of sale, including
accounts receivable, in proportion to the value of the raw materials in
the finished product. The manufacturer was to be the agent to collect
the accounts and hold the funds in trust for the plaintiff. This agree-
"Taylor v. Fisher Motor Co., 249 N.C. 617, 107 S.E.2d 94 (1959).
Where a statute gives the adult an interest in the chattel, however, the infant
is liable for losses sustained through the minor's failure to notify the adult of the
chattel's seizure and sale under forfeiture proceedings. Williams v. Aldridge
Motors, Inc., 237 N.C. 352, 75 S.E.2d 237 (1953).
" McCormick v. Crotts, 198 N.C. 664, 153 S.E. 152 (1930) ; Hight v. Harris,
188 N.C. 328, 124 S.E. 623 (1924) ; Chandler v. Jones, 172 N.C. 569, 90 S.E. 580
(1916) ; Pippen v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 130 N.C. 23, 40 S.E. 822 (1902).
A minor who avoided a compromise of his legacy has been required to account for
the property received under the compromise upon asserting a claim for the legacy.
Tipton v. Tipton, 48 N.C. 552 (1856).7 CAL. Cv. CoDD § 35 (1954) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-103 (1948) ; MONT. Rrv.
CODES ANN. § 64-107 (1953); N.D. REv. CODE § 14-1011 (1943); OKLA. STAT.
Tit. 15, § 19 (1937) ; S.D. CODE § 43.0105 (1939).
2248 N.C. 308, 103 S.E.2d 334 (1958).
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